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Abstract
Escalation is a typical feature of infinite games. Therefore tools con-
ceived for studying infinite mathematical structures, namely those deriv-
ing from coinduction are essential. Here we use coinduction, or back-
ward coinduction (to show its connection with the same concept for finite
games) to study carefully and formally the infinite games especially those
called dollar auctions, which are considered as the paradigm of escalation.
Unlike what is commonly admitted, we show that, provided one assumes
that the other agent will always stop, bidding is rational, because it re-
sults in a subgame perfect equilibrium. We show that this is not the only
rational strategy profile (the only subgame perfect equilibrium). Indeed
if an agent stops and will stop at every step, we claim that he is ratio-
nal as well, if one admits that his opponent will never stop, because this
corresponds to a subgame perfect equilibrium. Amazingly, in the infinite
dollar auction game, the behavior in which both agents stop at each step
is not a Nash equilibrium, hence is not a subgame perfect equilibrium,
hence is not rational. The right notion of rationality we obtain fits with
common sense and experience and remove all feeling of paradox.
Keyword: escalation, rationality, extensive form, backward induction.
JEL Code: C72, D44, D74.
1 Introduction
Escalation takes place in specific sequential games in which players continue al-
though their payoff decreases on the whole. The dollar auction game has been
presented by Shubik [1971] as the paradigm of escalation. He noted that, even
though their cost (the opposite of the payoff) basically increases, players may
keep bidding. This attitude is considered as inadequate and when talking about
escalation, Shubik [1971] says this is a paradox, O’Neill [1986] and Leininger
[1989] consider the bidders as irrational, Gintis [2000] speaks of illogic conflict
of escalation and Colman [1999] calls it Macbeth effect after Shakespeare’s play.
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In contrast with these authors, in this paper, we prove using a reasoning con-
ceived for infinite structures that escalation is logic and that agents are rational,
therefore this is not a paradox and we are led to assert that Macbeth is some-
what rational.
This escalation phenomenon occurs in infinite sequential games and only
there. Therefore it must be studied with adequate tools, i.e., in a framework
designed for mathematical infinite structures. Like Shubik [1971] we limit our-
selves to two players only. In auctions, this consists in the two players bidding
forever. This statement is based on the common assumption that a player is
rational if he adopts a strategy which corresponds to a subgame perfect equilib-
rium. To characterize this equilibrium the above cited authors consider a finite
restriction of the game for which they compute the subgame perfect equilib-
rium by backward induction1. In practice, they add a new hypothesis on the
amount of money the bidders are ready to pay, also called the limited bankroll.
In the amputated game, they conclude that there is a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium. This consists in both agents giving up immediately, not starting
the auction and adopting the same choice at each step. In our formalization
in infinite games, we show that extending that case up to infinity is not a sub-
game perfect equilibrium and we found two subgame perfect equilibria, namely
the cases when one agent continues at each step and the other leaves at each
step. Those equilibria which correspond to rational attitudes account for the
phenomenon of escalation.
The origin of the misconception that concludes the irrationality of escalation
is the belief that properties of infinite mathematical objects can be extrapolated
from properties of finite objects. This does not work. As Fagin [1993] recalls,
“most of the classical theorems of logic [for infinite structures] fail for finite
structures” (see Ebbinghaus and Flum [1995] for a full development of the fi-
nite model theory). The reciprocal holds obviously “most of the results which
hold for finite structures, fail for infinite structures”. This has been beautifully
evidenced in mathematics, when Weierstrass [1872] has exhibited his function:
f(x) =
∞∑
n=0
bn cos(anxπ).
Every finite sum is differentiable and the limit, i.e., the infinite sum, is not. To
give another picture, infinite games are to finite games what fractal curves are
to smooth curves [Edgar, 2008]. In game theory the error done by the nineti-
eth century mathematicians (Weierstrass quotes Cauchy, Dirichlet and Gauss)
would lead to the same issue: wrong assumptions. With what we are concerned,
a result that holds on finite games does not hold necessarily on infinite games
and vice-versa. More specifically equilibria on finite games are not preserved
at the limit on infinite games. In particular, we cannot conclude that, whereas
the only rational attitude in finite dollar auction would be to stop immediately,
it is irrational to escalate in the case of an infinite auction. We have to keep
1What is called “backward induction” in game theory is roughly what is called “induction”
in logic.
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in mind that in the case of escalation, the game is infinite, therefore reason-
ing made for finite objects are inappropriate and tools specifically conceived
for infinite objects should be adopted. Like Weierstrass’ discovery led to the
development of function series, logicians have invented methods for deductions
on infinite structures and the right framework for reasoning logically on infinite
mathematical objects is called coinduction.
Like induction, coinduction is based on a fixpoint, but whereas induction is
based on the least fixpoint, coinduction is based on the greatest fixpoint, for an
ordering we are not going to describe here as it would go beyond the scope of this
paper. Attached to induction is the concept of inductive definition, which char-
acterizes objects like finite lists, finite trees, finite games, finite strategy profiles,
etc. Similarly attached to coinduction is the concept of coinductive definition
which characterizes streams (infinite lists), infinite trees, infinite games, infinite
strategy profiles etc. An inductive definition yields the least set that satisfies the
definition and a coinductive definition yields the greatest set that satisfies the
definition. Associated with these definitions we have inference principles. For
induction there is the famous induction principle used in backward induction.
On coinductively defined sets of objects there is a principle like induction prin-
ciple which uses the fact that the set satisfies the definition (proofs by case or by
pattern) and that it is the largest set with this property. Since coinductive defi-
nitions allow us building infinite objects, one can imagine constructing a specific
category of objects with “loops”, like the infinite word (abc)ω (i.e., abcabcabc...)
which is made by repeating the sequence abc infinitely many times (other exam-
ples with trees are given in Section 2, with infinite games and strategy profiles
in Section 6). Such an object is a fixpoint, this means that it contains an object
like itself. For instance (abc)ω = abc(abc)ω contains itself. We say that such an
object is defined as a cofixpoint. To prove a property P on a cofixpoint o = f(o),
one assumes P holds on o (the o in f(o)), considered as a sub-object of o. If one
can prove P on the whole object (on f(o)), then one has proved that P holds
on o. This is called the coinduction principle a concept which comes from Park
[1981], Milner and Tofte [1991], and Aczel [1988] (see also [Pair, 1970]) and was
introduced in the framework we are considering by Coquand [1993]. Sangiorgi
[2009] gives a good survey with a complete historical account. To be sure not
be entangled, it is advisable to use a proof assistant that implements coinduc-
tion to build and check the proof, but reasoning with coinduction is sometimes
so counter-intuitive that the use of a proof assistant is not only advisable but
compulsory. For instance, we were, at first, convinced that the strategy profile
consisting in both agents stopping at every step was a Nash equilibrium, like in
the finite case, and only failing in proving it mechanically convinced us of the
contrary and we were able to prove the opposite. In our case we have checked
every statement using Coq and in what follows a sentence like “we have prover
that ...” means that we have succeeded in building a formal proof in Coq.
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Backward coinduction as a method for proving invariants
In infinite strategy profiles, the coinduction principles can be seen as follows:
a property which holds on a strategy profile of an infinite extensive game is an
invariant, i.e., a property that stays always true, along the temporal line and
to prove that this is an invariant one proceeds back to the past. Therefore the
name backward coinduction is appropriate, since it proceeds backward the time,
from future to past.
Backward induction vs backward coinduction
One may wonder the difference between the classical method, which we call
backward induction and the new method we propose, which we call backward
coinduction. The main difference is that backward induction starts the reason-
ing from the leaves, works only on finite games and does not work on infinite
games (or on finite strategy profiles), because it requires a well-foundedness to
work properly, whereas backward coinduction works on infinite games (or on
infinite strategy profiles). Coinduction is unavoidable on infinite games, since
the methods that consists in “cutting the tail” to get a finite game or a finite
strategy profile cannot solve the problem or even approximate it. Using back-
ward induction to a game which is intrinsically infinite like the escalation in the
dollar auction was a mistake. It is indeed the same erroneous reasoning as this
of the predecessors of Weierstrass who concluded that since:
∀p ∈ N, f(x) =
p∑
n=0
bn cos(anxπ),
is differentiable everywhere then
f(x) =
∞∑
n=0
bn cos(anxπ).
is differentiable everywhere whereas it is differentiable nowhere.
Much earlier, during the IVth century BC, the improper use of inductive
reasoning allows Parmenides and Zeno to negate motion and leads to Zeno’s
paradox of Achilles and the tortoise. This paradox was reported by Aristotle as
follows:
“In a race, the quickest runner can never overtake the slow-
est, since the pursuer must first reach the point whence the pursued
started, so that the slower must always hold a lead.”
Aristotle, Physics VI:9, 239b15
Zeno’s reasoning is correct, because by induction, one can prove that Achilles
will never overtake the tortoise, but we know by experience that this is not the
case, hence the paradox. Zeno error was to apply induction to an infinite object,
he should have used coinduction if he would have known this concept.
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Von Neumann and coinduction
As one knows, von Neumann [von Neumann, 1928, von Neumann and Mor-
genstern, 1944] is the creator of game theory, whereas extensive games and
equilibrium in non cooperative games are due to Kuhn [1953] and Nash, Jr.
[1950]. In the spirit of their creators all those games are finite and backward in-
duction is the basic principle for computing subgame perfect equilibria [Selten,
1965]. This is not surprising since von Neumann [1925] is also at the origin of
the role of well-foundedness in set theory despite he left a door open for a not
well-founded membership relation. As explained by Sangiorgi [2009], research
on anti-foundation initiated by Mirimanoff [1917] are at the origin of coinduction
and were not well known until the work of Aczel [1988].
Why in infinite plays, agents do not have a utility ?
In our framework, in an infinite play (a play that runs forever, i.e., that does not
lead to a leaf) no agent has a utility. People might say that this an anomaly,
but we claim that this is perfectly sensible. Let us affirm that in arbitrary
long plays, which lead to a leaf, all agents have a utility. Only in plays that
diverge, it is the case that agents have no utility. This fits well with Binmore
[1988] statements “The use of computing machines (automata) to model players
in an evolutive context is presumably uncontroversial ... machines are also
appropriate for modeling players in an eductive context”. Here we are concerned
by the eductive context where “equilibrium is achieved through careful reasoning
by the agents before and during the play of the game” [Binmore, 1988, loc. cit].
By automaton, we mean any model of computation2, since all the models of
computation are equivalent by Church thesis. If an agent is modeled by an
automaton, this means also that the function that computes the utility for this
agent is also modeled by an automaton. It seems then sensible that one cannot
compute the utility of an agent for an infinite play, since computing is a finite
process working on finite data (or at least data that are finitely described). Since
the agent cannot compute the utility of an infinite play, no sensible value can be
attributed to him. If one wants absolutely to assign a value to an infinite play,
one must abandon the automaton framework and moreover this value should
be the limit of a sequence of values, which does not exist in most of the cases.3
For instance, in the case of the dollar auction (Section 6), the utility associated
with the unique infinite play are the sequence ..., v+n, n+1, v+n+1, n+2, ...
Therefore considering that in infinite plays, agents have no utility is perfectly
consistent with a modeling of agents by automata. By the way, does an agent
care about a payoff he (she) receives in infinitely many years? Will he (she)
adapt his (her) strategy on this?
2Our model of computation is this of the calculus of inductive construction, a kind of
λ-calculus behind Coq [Turing, 1937].
3If utilities are natural numbers, it exists only if the sequence is stationary, which is not
the case in escalation.
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Proof assistants vs automated theorem provers
Coq is a proof assistant built by Coq development team [2007], see Bertot and
Caste´ran [2004] for a good introduction and notice that they call it “interactive
theorem provers”, which is a strict synonymous. Despite both deal with theo-
rems and their proofs and are mechanized using a computer, proof assistants are
not automated theorem provers. In particular, they are much more expressive
than automated theorem provers and this the reason why they are interactive.
For instance, there is no automated theorem prover implementing coinduction.
Proof assistants are automated only for elementary steps and interactive for the
rest. A specificity of a proof assistant is that it builds a mathematical object
called a (formal) proof which can be checked independently, copied, stored and
exchanged. Following Harrison [2008] and Dowek [2007], we can consider that
they are the tools of the mathematicians of the XXIth century. Therefore using
a proof assistant is a highly mathematical modern activity.
The mathematical development presented here corresponds to a Coq script4
which can be found on the following url’s:
http://perso.ens-lyon.fr/pierre.lescanne/COQ/EscRat/
http://perso.ens-lyon.fr/pierre.lescanne/COQ/EscRat/SCRIPTS/
Structure of the paper
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present coinduction illus-
trated by the example of infinite binary trees. In Section 3 we present infinite
games. In Section 4, we introduce the core concept of infinite strategy profile
which allows us presenting equilibria in Section 5. The dollar auction game is
presented in Section 6 and the escalation is discussed in Section 7. Readers who
want to have a quick idea about the results of this paper on the rationality of
escalation are advised to read sections 6, 7 and 9.
Related works
To our knowledge, the only application of coinduction to extensive game theory
has been made by Capretta [2007] who uses coinduction to define only common
knowledge not equilibria in infinite games. Another strongly connected work is
this of Coupet-Grimal [2003] on temporal logic. Other applications are on rep-
resentation of real numbers by infinite sequences [Bertot, 2007, Julien, 2008] and
implementation of streams (infinite lists) in electronic circuits [Coupet-Grimal
and Jakubiec, 2004]. An ancestor of our description of infinite games and infinite
strategy profiles is the constructive description of finite games, finite strategy
profiles, and equilibria by Vestergaard [2006]. Lescanne [2009] introduces the
framework of infinite games with more detail. Infinite games are introduced in
Osborne and Rubinstein [1994] and Osborne [2004] using histories, but this is
not algorithmic and therefore not amenable to formal proofs and coinduction.
4A script is a list of commands of a proof assistant.
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Many authors have studied infinite games (see for instance Martin [1998],
Mazala [2001]), but except the name “game” (an overloaded one), those games
have nothing to see with infinite extensive games as presented in this paper.
The infiniteness of Blackwell games for instance is derived from a topology,
by adding real numbers and probability. Sangiorgi [2009] mentioned the con-
nection between Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ games [Ebbinghaus and Flum, 1995] and
coinduction, but the connection with extensive games is extremely remote.
2 Coinduction and infinite binary trees
As an example of a coinductive definition consider this of lazy binary trees,
i.e., finite and infinite binary trees.

•
 
•
• 
 
. . .
•
• •
  • 
•
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
. . .
•
 •
• 
 •
• 

Backbone Zig
Figure 1: Coinductive binary trees
A coinductive binary tree (or a lazy binary tree or a finite-infinite
binary tree) is
• either the empty binary tree ,
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• or a binary tree of the form t ·t′, where t and t′ are binary trees.
By the keyword coinductive we mean that we define a coinductive set of
objects, hence we accept infinite objects. Some coinductive binary trees are
given on Fig. 1. We define on a coinductive binary tree a predicate which has
also a coinductive definition:
A binary tree is infinite if (coinductively)
• either its left subtree is infinite
• or its right subtree is infinite.
We define two trees that we call zig and zag.
zig and zag are defined together as cofixpoints as follows:
• zig has  as left subtree and zag as right subtree,
• zag has zig as left subtree and  as right subtree.
This says that zig and zag are the greatest solutions5 of the two simultaneous
equations:
zig =  · zag
zag = zig ·
•
•
 •
zig 
⇒
•
•
 •
zig 
zig
Figure 2: How cofix works on zig for is infinite?
It is common sense that zig and zag are infinite, but to prove that “zig
is infinite” using the cofix tactic6, we do as follows: assume “zig is infinite”,
then zag is infinite, from which we get that “zig is infinite”. Since we use the
assumption on a strict subtree of zig (the direct subtree of zag, which is itself a
5In this case, the least solutions are uninteresting as they are objects nowhere defined.
Indeed there is no basic case in the inductive definition.
6The cofix tactic is a method proposed by the proof assistant Coq which implements
coinduction on cofixpoint objects. Roughly speaking, it attempts to prove that a property is
an invariant, by proving it is preserved along the infinite object. Here “ is infinite” is such
an invariant on zig.
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direct subtree of zig) we can conclude that the cofix tactic has been used properly
and that the property holds, namely that “zig is infinite”. This is pictured on
Fig.2, where the square box represents the predicate is infinite. Above the rule,
there is the step of coinduction and below the rule the conclusion, namely that
the whole zig is infinite. We let the reader prove that backbone is infinite, where
backbone is the greatest fixpoint of the equation:
backbone = backbone · 
and is an infinite tree that looks like the skeleton of a infinite centipede game
as shown on Fig.1 (see Section 8).
Interested readers may have a look at Coupet-Grimal [2003], Coupet-Grimal
and Jakubiec [2004], Lescanne [2009], Bertot [2005, 2007] and especially Bertot
and Caste´ran [2004, chap. 13] for other examples of cofix reasoning.
3 Finite and infinite games
As an intermediary between histories and strategy profiles, let us define finite
and infinite games. Traditionally, games are defined through trees associated
with utility function at the leaves. Another approach which Osborne [2004] at-
tributes to Rubinstein uses histories. A third approach proposed by Vestergaard
[2006] which fits well with inductive reasoning is to give an inductive definition
of games. To handle infinite games we propose a coinductive definition.
The type of Games is defined as a coinductive as follows:
• a Utility function makes a Game,
• an Agent and two Games make a Game.
A Game is either a leaf (a terminal node) or a composed game made of an
agent (the agent who has the turn) and two subgames (the formal definition in
the Coq vernacular is given in the appendix A). We use the expression gLeaf f
to denote the leaf game associated with the utility function f and the expression
gNode a gl gr to denote the game with agent a at the root and two subgames
gl and gr.
Hence one builds a finite game in two ways: either a given utility function f
is encapsulated by the operator gLeaf to make the game (gLeaf f ), or an agent
a and two games gl and gr are given to make the game (gNode a gl gr). Notice
that in such games, it can be the case that the same agent a has the turn twice
in a row, like in the game (gNode a (gNode a g1 g2) g3).
Concerning comparisons of utilities we consider a very general setting where
a utility is no more that a type (a “set”) with a preference which is a preorder,
i. e., a transitive and reflexive relation, and which we write . A preorder is
enough for what we want to prove. We assign to the leaves, a utility function
which associates a utility to each agent.
We can also tell how we associate a history with a game or a history and
a utility function with a game (see the Coq script). We will see in the next
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section how to associate a utility with an agent in a game, this is done in the
frame of a strategy profile, which is described now.
4 Finite or infinite strategy profiles
In this section we define finite or infinite binary strategy profiles or StratProf s
in short. They are based on games which are extensive (or sequential) games
and in which each agent has two choices: ℓ (left) and r (right).7 In addition
these games are infinite, we should say “can be infinite”, as we consider both
finite and infinite games. We do not give explicitly the definition of a finite or
infinite extensive game since we do not use it in what follows, but it can be
easily obtained by removing the choices from a strategy profile. To define finite
or infinite strategy profiles, we suppose given a utility and a utility function.
As said, we define directly strategy profiles as they are the only concept we are
interested in. Indeed an equilibrium is a strategy profile.
The type of StratProf s is defined as a coinductive as follows:
• a Utility function makes a StratProf.
• an Agent, a Choice and two StratProf s make a StratProf.
Basically8 an infinite strategy profile which is not a leaf is a node with four
items: an agent, a choice, two infinite strategy profiles. A strategy profile is a
game plus a choice at each node. Strategy profiles of the first kind are written
≪ f ≫ and strategy profiles of the second kind are written ≪ a, c, sl, sr ≫.
In other words, if between the “≪” and the “≫” there is one component, this
component is a utility function and the result is a leaf strategy profile and if
there are four components, this is a compound strategy profile. In what follows,
we say that sl and sr are strategy subprofiles of ≪ a, c, sl, sr≫. For instance,
here are the drawing of two strategy profiles (s0 and s1):
Alice Bob Alice7→0,Bob7→1
Alice 7→ 1,Bob 7→ 2 Alice7→2,Bob 7→0
Alice Bob Alice7→0,Bob7→1
Alice 7→ 1,Bob 7→ 2 Alice7→2,Bob 7→0
which correspond to the expressions
7In pictures, we take a subjective point of view: left and right are from the perspective
of the agent.
8The formal definition in the Coq vernacular is given in appendix A.
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s0 =≪Alice,ℓ,≪Bob, ℓ, ≪Alice 7→ 0,Bob 7→ 1≫, ≪Alice 7→ 2,Bob 7→ 0≫≫,
≪Alice 7→ 1,Bob 7→ 2≫≫
and
s1 =≪Alice,r ,≪Bob,ℓ,≪Alice 7→ 0,Bob 7→ 1≫, ≪Alice 7→ 2,Bob 7→ 0≫,
≪Alice 7→ 1,Bob 7→ 2≫,≫.
To describe a specific infinite strategy profile one uses most of the time a
fixpoint equation like:
t = ≪Alice, r ,≪Alice 7→ 0,Bob 7→ 0≫,≪Bob, r , t, t≫≫
which corresponds to the pictures:
t
=
A1
A1 7→ 0,A2 7→ 0
A2
t t
Other examples of infinite strategy profiles are given in Section 6. Usually
an infinite game is defined as a cofixpoint, i.e., as the solution of an equation,
possibly a parametric equation.
Whereas in the finite case one can easily associate with a strategy profile
a utility function, i.e., a function which assigns a utility to an agent, as the
result of a recursive evaluation, this is no more the case with infinite strategy
profiles. One reason is that it is no more the case that the utility function can be
computed since the strategy profile may run for ever. This makes the function
partial9 and it cannot be defined as an inductive or a coinductive. Therefore we
make s2u (an abbreviation for Strategy-profile-to-Utility) a relation between a
strategy profile and a utility function and we define it coinductively; s2u appears
in expression of the form10 (s2u s a u) where s is a strategy profile, a is an agent
and u is a utility. It reads “u is a utility of the agent a in the strategy profile s”.
s2u is a predicate defined inductively as follows:
• s2u≪f≫ a (f(a)) holds,
• if s2u sl a u holds then s2u ≪a
′, ℓ, sl, sr≫ a u holds,
• if s2u sr a u holds then s2u ≪a
′, r , sl, sr≫ a u holds.
This means the utility of a for the leaf strategy profile≪f≫ is f(a), i.e., the
value delivered by the function f when applied to a. The utility of a for the
strategy profile ≪a′, ℓ, sl, sr≫ is u if the utility of a for the strategy profile sl
9Assigning arbitrarily (i.e., not algorithmically) a utility function to an infinite “history”,
as it is made sometimes in the literature, is artificial and not really handy for formal reasoning.
10Notice the lighter notation (f x y z) for what is usually written f(x)(y)(z).
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is u. In the case of s0, the first above strategy profile, one has s2u s0 Alice 2,
which means that, for the strategy profile s0, the utility of Alice is 2.
For a game there are many associated possible strategy profiles, which have
a similar structure, but on the other hand there is a function which returns a
game given a strategy profile.
5 Subgame perfect and Nash equilibria
5.1 Convertibility
An important binary relation on strategy profiles is convertibility. We write
⊢a⊣. the convertibility of agent a.
The relation ⊢a⊣ is defined inductively as follows:
• ⊢a⊣ is reflexive, i.e., for all s, s⊢a⊣ s.
• If the node has the same agent as the agent in ⊢a⊣ then the
choice may change, i.e.,
s1 ⊢a⊣ s
′
1 s2 ⊢a⊣ s
′
2
≪a, c, s1, s2≫ ⊢a⊣ ≪a, c
′, s′1, s
′
2≫
• If the node does not have the same agent as in ⊢a⊣, then the
choice has to be the same:
s1 ⊢a⊣ s
′
1 s2 ⊢a⊣ s
′
2
≪a′, c, s1, s2≫ ⊢a⊣ ≪a
′, c, s′1, s
′
2≫
Roughly speaking two strategy profiles are convertible for a if they change
only for the choices for a. Since it is defined inductively, this means that those
changes are finitely many. We feels that this makes sense since an agent can
only conceive finitely many issues.
5.2 Nash equilibria
The notion of Nash equilibrium is translated from the notion in textbooks. The
concept of Nash equilibrium is based on a comparison of utilities; this assumes
that an actual utility exists and therefore this requires convertible strategy pro-
files to “lead to a leaf”. s is a Nash equilibrium if the following implication
holds:
If s “leads to a leaf” and for all agent a and for all strategy profile s′
which is convertible to s, i.e., s⊢a⊣ s′, and which “leads to a leaf”,
if u is the utility of s for a and u′ is the utility of s’ for a, then
u′  u.
Roughly speaking this means that a Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile in
which no agent has interest to change his choice since doing so he cannot get a
better payoff.
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5.3 Subgame Perfect Equilibria
In order to insure that s2u has a result we define an operator “leads to a leaf”
that says that if one follows the choices shown by the strategy profile one reaches
a leaf, i.e., one does not go forever.
The predicate “leads to a leaf” is defined inductively as
• the strategy profile ≪f≫ “leads to a leaf”,
• if sl “leads to a leaf”, then ≪a, ℓ, sl, sr≫ “leads to a leaf”,
• if sr “leads to a leaf”, then ≪a, r , sl, sr≫ “leads to a leaf”.
This means that a strategy profile, which is itself a leaf, “leads to a leaf”
and if the strategy profile is a node, if the choice is ℓ and if the left strategy
subprofile “leads to a leaf” then the whole strategy profile “leads to a leaf” and
similarly if the choice is r .
If s is a strategy profile that satisfies the predicate “leads to a leaf” then the
utility exists and is unique, in other words:
• For all agent a and for all strategy profile s, if s “leads to a leaf” then
there exists a utility u which “is a utility of the agent a in the strategy
profile s”.
• For all agent a and for all strategy profile s, if s “leads to a leaf”, if “u is
a utility of the agent a in the strategy profile s” and “v is a utility of the
agent a in the strategy profile s” then u = v.
This means s2u works like a function on strategy profiles which lead to a
leaf. We also consider a predicate “always leads to a leaf” which means that
everywhere in the strategy profile, if one follows the choices, one leads to a
leaf. This property is defined everywhere on an infinite strategy profile and is
therefore coinductive.
The predicate “always leads to a leaf” is defined coinductively
by saying:
• the strategy profile ≪f≫ “always leads to a leaf”,
• for all choice c, if ≪ a, c, sl, sr ≫ “leads to a leaf”, if sl “al-
ways leads to a leaf”, if sr “always leads to a leaf”, then
≪a, c, sl, sr≫ “always leads to a leaf”.
This says that a strategy profile, which is a leaf, “always leads to a leaf”
and that a composed strategy profile inherits the predicate from its strategy
subprofiles provided itself “leads to a leaf”.
Let us consider now subgame perfect equilibria, which we write SGPE.
SGPE is a property of strategy profiles. It requires the strategy subprofiles
to fulfill coinductively the same property, namely to be a SGPE, and to insure
that the strategy profile with the best utility for the node agent to be cho-
sen. Since both the strategy profile and its strategy subprofiles are potentially
infinite, it makes sense to define SGPE coinductively.
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SGPE is defined coinductively as follows:
• SGPE ≪f≫,
• if ≪ a, ℓ, sl, sr ≫ “always leads to a leaf”, if SGPE(sl) and
SGPE(sr), if s2u sl a u and s2u sr a v, if v  u
then SGPE ≪a, ℓ, sl, sr≫,
• if ≪ a, r , sl, sr ≫ “always leads to a leaf”, if SGPE(sl) and
SGPE(sr), if s2u sl a u and s2u sr a v, if u  v
then SGPE ≪a, r , sl, sr≫,
This means that a strategy profile, which is a leaf, is a subgame perfect
equilibrium. Moreover if the strategy profile is a node, if the strategy profile
“always leads to a leaf”, if it has agent a and choice ℓ, if both strategy subprofiles
are subgame perfect equilibria and if the utility of the agent a for the right
strategy subprofile is less than this for the left strategy subprofile then the
whole strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium and vice versa. If the
choice is r this works similarly.
Notice that since we require that the utility can be computed not only for
the strategy profile, but for the strategy subprofiles and for the strategy sub-
subprofiles and so on, we require these strategy profiles not only to “lead to a
leaf” but to “always lead to a leaf”.
We define orders (one for each agent a) between strategy profiles which we
write ≤a.
s′ ≤a s iff : If u (respectively u’) is the utility for a in s (resp. s
′),
then u′  u
Proposition 1 ≤a is an order (the proof is straight forward).
Proposition 2 A subgame perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose that s is a strategy profile which is a SGPE and
which has to be proved to be is a Nash equilibrium.
Assuming that s′ is a strategy profile such that s⊢a⊣ s′, let us
prove by induction on s⊢a⊣ s′ that s′ ≤a s:
• Case s = s′, by reflexivity, s′ ≤a s.
• Case s =≪ x, ℓ, sl, sr ≫ and s
′ =≪ x, ℓ, s′l, s
′
r ≫ with x 6= a.
s⊢a⊣ s′ and the definition of ⊢a⊣ imply sl ⊢a⊣ s
′
l and sr ⊢a⊣ s
′
r.
sl which is a strategy subprofile of a SGPE is a SGPE as well.
Hence by induction hypothesis, s′l ≤a sl.
The utility of s (respectively of s′) for a is the utility of sl
(respectively of s′l) for a, then s
′ ≤a s.
• The case s=≪x, r , sl, sr≫ and s
′=≪x, r , s′l, s
′
r≫ is similar.
• Case s=≪a, ℓ, sl, sr≫ and s
′=≪a, r , s′l, s
′
r≫, then sl ⊢a⊣ s
′
l
and sr ⊢a⊣ s
′
r. Since s is a SGPE, sr ≤a sl.
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Alice Bob Alice Bob
v+n,n n+1,v+n v+n+1,n+1 n+2,v+n+1
Figure 3: The dollar auction game
Moreover, since sr is a SGPE, by induction hypothesis, s
′
r ≤
sr. Hence, by transitivity of ≤a, s
′
r ≤a sl. But we know that
the utility of s′ for a is this of s′r and the utility of s for a is
this of sl, hence s
′ ≤a s.
• The case s=≪a, r , sl, sr≫ and s
′=≪a, ℓ, s′l, s
′
r≫ is similar.

The above proof is a presentation of the formal proof written with the help of
the proof assistant Coq. Notice that it is by induction on ⊢a⊣ which is possible
since ⊢a⊣ is inductively defined. Notice also that s and s′ are potentially infinite.
6 Dollar auction games and Nash equilibria
The dollar auction has been presented by Shubik [1971] as the paradigm of
escalation, insisting on its paradoxical aspect. It is a sequential game presented
as an auction in which two agents compete to acquire an object of value v
(v > 0) (see Gintis [2000, Ex. 3.13]). Suppose that both agents bid $1 at each
turn. If one of them gives up, the other receives the object and both pay the
amount of their bid.11 For instance, if agent Alice stops immediately, she pays
nothing and agent Bob, who acquires the object, has a payoff v. In the general
turn of the auction, if Alice abandons, she looses the auction and has a payoff
−n and Bob who has already bid −n has a payoff v − n. At the next turn
after Alice decides to continue, bids $1 for this and acquires the object due to
Bob stopping, Alice has a payoff v− (n+1) and Bob has a payoff −n. In our
formalization we have considered the dollar auction up to infinity. Since we are
interested only by the “asymptotic” behavior, we can consider the auction after
the value of the object has been passed and the payoffs are negative. The dollar
auction game can be summarized by Fig. 3. Notice that we assume that Alice
starts. We have recognized three classes of infinite strategy profiles, indexed
by n:
1. The strategy profile always give up, in which both Alice and Bob stop
at each turn, in short dolAsBsn.
11In a variant, each bidder, when he bids, puts a dollar bill in a hat or in a piggy bank and
their is no return at the end of the auction. The last bidder gets the object.
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2. The strategy profile Alice stops always and Bob continues always, in
short dolAsBcn.
3. The strategy profile Alice continues always and Bob stops always, in
short dolAcBsn.
The three kinds of strategy profiles are presented in Fig. 4.
Alice Bob Alice Bob
v+n,n n+1,v+n v+n+1,n+1 n+2,v+n+1
dolAsBsn aka Always give up
Alice Bob Alice Bob
v+n,n n+1,v+n v+n+1,n+1 n+2,v+n+1
dolAsBcn aka Alice abandons always and Bob continues always
Alice Bob Alice Bob
v+n,n n+1,v+n v+n+1,n+1 n+2,v+n+1
dolAcBsn aka Alice continues always and Bob abandons always
Figure 4: Three strategy profiles
We have shown12 that the second and third kinds of strategy profiles, in
which one of the agents always stops and the other continues, are subgame
perfect equilibria. For instance, consider the strategy profile dolAsBcn. Assume
SGPE (dolAsBcn+1). It works as follows: if dolAsBcn+1 is a subgame perfect
equilibrium corresponding to the payoff −(v + n+ 1),−(n+ 1), then
≪Bob, ℓ, dolAsBcn+1,≪Alice 7→ n+ 1,Bob 7→ v + n≫≫
is again a subgame perfect equilibrium (since v + n ≥ n + 1) and therefore
dolAsBcn is a subgame perfect equilibrium, since again v + n ≥ n + 1.
13 We
12The proofs are typical uses of the Coq cofix tactic.
13Since the cofix tactic has been used on a strict strategy subprofile, the reasoning is correct.
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can conclude that for all n, dolAsBcn is a subgame perfect equilibrium. In other
words, we have assumed that SGPE (dolAsBcn) is an invariant all along the
game and that this invariant is preserved as we proceed backward, through
time, into the game.
With the condition v > 1, we can prove that dolAsBs0 is not a Nash equi-
librium, then as a consequence not a subgame perfect equilibrium. Therefore,
the strategy profile that consists in stopping from the beginning and forever is
not a Nash equilibrium, this contradicts what is said in the literature [Shubik,
1971, O’Neill, 1986, Leininger, 1989, Gintis, 2000].
7 Why escalation is rational?
Many authors agree (see however [Halpern, 2001, Stalnaker, 1998]) that choosing
a subgame perfect equilibrium is rational [Aumann, 1995]. Let us show that this
can lead to an escalation. Suppose I am Alice in the middle of the auction,
I have two options that are rational: one option is to stop right away, since I
assume that Bob will continue always. But the second option says that it could
be the case that from now on Bob will stop always (strategy profile dolAcBsn)
and I will always continue which is a subgame perfect equilibrium hence rational.
If Bob acts similarly this is the escalation. So at each step an agent can stop and
be rational, as well as at each step an agent can continue and be rational; both
options make perfect sense. We claim that human agents reason coinductively
unknowingly. Therefore, for them, escalation is one of their rational options at
least if one considers strictly the rules of the dollar auction game, in particular
with no limit on the bankroll. Many experiences [Colman, 1999] have shown
that human are inclined to escalate or at least to go very far in the auction
when playing the dollar auction game. We propose the following explanation:
the finiteness of the game was not explicit for the participants and for them the
game was naturally infinite. Therefore they adopted a form of reasoning similar
to the one we developed here, probably in an intuitive form and they conclude
it was equally rational to continue or to leave according to their feeling on the
threat of their opponent, hence their attitude. Actually our theoretical work
reconciles experiences with logic,14 and human with rationality.
8 Another example: the infinipede
An often studied extensive game is the so-called centipede15 introduced by
Rosenthal [1981] (see also Binmore [1987], Colman [1998], Osborne and Rubin-
stein [1994]). Whereas centipedes are finite extensive games, we have studied
games with infinitely many “legs”, which we propose to call infinipedes. In-
finipedes are generalization to infinity of centipedes. In infinipedes, we have
14A logic which includes coinduction.
15 A centipede has hundred legs, whereas a millipede has thousand. All belong to the group
of myriapods which means “ten thousand legs”.
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identified only one subgame perfect equilibrium, namely this where both agents
abandon at each turn. This shows that even in the infinite generalization, agents
are rational if they do not start the game and abandon from the beginning.
Hence the paradox discussed by the authors still remains, namely the agents
do not get the somewhat better payoff, they would get if they would be more
flexible with respect to rationality. The problem for the agents in the infinipede
game is that when they start an infinite game, they do not know when to stop.
We notice the specific status of the strategy profile ac in which all agents
continue forever. Since ac cannot attribute payoffs to the agents, it cannot be
compared with any other strategy profile and lies isolated in its own attractor
(in term of equilibrium). The headlong run ac is somewhat rational despite it
does not deliver any reward.
9 Conclusion
We have shown that coinduction is the right tool to study infinite structures,
e. g., the infinite dollar auction game. This way we get results which contradict
forty years of claims that escalation is irrational. We can show where the failure
comes from, namely from the fact that authors have extrapolated on infinite
structures results obtained on finite ones. Actually in a strategy profile in
which one of the agents threatens credibly the other to continue in every case,
common sense says that the other agent should abandon at each step (taking
seriously the threat), this is a subgame perfect equilibrium. If the threat to
continue is not credible, the other agent may think that his opponent bluffs
and will abandon at every step from now on, hence a rational attitude for him
is to continue. As a matter of fact, coinduction meets common sense. Since
our reasoning on infinite games proceeds from future to past, we call backward
coinduction the new method for proving that a given infinite strategy profile is
a subgame perfect equilibrium. This study has also demonstrated the use of a
proof assistant in such a development. Indeed the results on infinite objects are
sometime so counter-intuitive that a check on a proof assistant is essential. We
think that this opens new perspectives to game theory toward a more formal
approach based on the last advances in mathematics offered by proof assistants
[Harrison, 2008, Dowek, 2007]. Among others, an issue is to extend Aumann’s
connection [Aumann, 1995] between subgame perfect equilibria (or backward
coinduction) and coinductively defined common knowledge [Capretta, 2007].
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A Excerpts of Coq scripts
Infinite binary trees
CoInductive LBintree : Set :=
— LbtNil : LBintree
— LbtNode: LBintree → LBintree → LBintree.
CoInductive InfiniteLBT : LBintree → Prop :=
— IBTLeft : ∀ bl br, InfiniteLBT bl → InfiniteLBT (LbtNode bl br)
— IBTRight : ∀ bl br, InfiniteLBT br → InfiniteLBT (LbtNode bl br).
CoFixpoint Zig: LBintree := LbtNode Zag LbtNil
with Zag: LBintree := LbtNode LbtNil Zig.
Infinite strategy profiles
CoInductive StratProf : Set :=
— sLeaf : Utility fun → StratProf
— sNode : Agent → Choice → StratProf → StratProf → StratProf.
Inductive s2u : StratProf → Agent → Utility → Prop :=
— s2uLeaf : ∀ a f, s2u (≪ f≫) a (f a)
— s2uLeft : ∀ (a a’ :Agent) (u:Utility) (sl sr :StratProf ),
s2u sl a u → s2u (≪ a’,l,sl,sr≫) a u
— s2uRight : ∀ (a a’ :Agent) (u:Utility) (sl sr :StratProf ),
s2u sr a u → s2u (≪ a’,r,sl,sr≫) a u.
Inductive LeadsToLeaf : StratProf → Prop :=
— LtLLeaf : ∀ f, LeadsToLeaf (≪ f≫)
— LtLLeft : ∀ (a:Agent)(sl : StratProf ) (sr :StratProf ),
LeadsToLeaf sl → LeadsToLeaf (≪ a,l,sl,sr≫)
— LtLRight : ∀ (a:Agent)(sl : StratProf ) (sr :StratProf ),
LeadsToLeaf sr → LeadsToLeaf (≪ a,r,sl,sr≫).
CoInductive AlwLeadsToLeaf : StratProf → Prop :=
— ALtLeaf : ∀ (f :Utility fun), AlwLeadsToLeaf (≪f≫)
— ALtL : ∀ (a:Agent)(c:Choice)(sl sr :StratProf ),
LeadsToLeaf (≪a,c,sl,sr≫)→ AlwLeadsToLeaf sl →AlwLeadsToLeaf sr →
AlwLeadsToLeaf (≪a,c,sl,sr≫).
SGPE
CoInductive SGPE : StratProf → Prop :=
— SGPE leaf : ∀ f :Utility fun, SGPE (≪f≫)
A EXCERPTS OF COQ SCRIPTS April 25, 2010 – 23
— SGPE left : ∀ (a:Agent)(u v : Utility) (sl sr : StratProf ),
AlwLeadsToLeaf (≪a,l,sl,sr≫) →
SGPE sl → SGPE sr →
s2u sl a u → s2u sr a v → (v u) →
SGPE (≪a,l,sl,sr≫)
— SGPE right : ∀ (a:Agent) (u v :Utility) (sl sr : StratProf ),
AlwLeadsToLeaf (≪a,r,sl,sr≫) →
SGPE sl → SGPE sr →
s2u sl a u → s2u sr a v → (u v) →
SGPE (≪a,r,sl,sr≫).
Nash equilibrium
Definition NashEq (s : StratProf ): Prop :=
∀ a s’ u u’, s’⊢a⊣s →
LeadsToLeaf s’ → (s2u s’ a u’) →
LeadsToLeaf s → (s2u s a u) →
(u’ u).
Alice stops always and Bob continues always
Definition add Alice Bob dol (cA cB :Choice) (n:nat) (s :Strat) :=
≪Alice,cA,≪Bob, cB,s,[n+1, v+n]≫,[v+n,n]≫.
CoFixpoint dolAcBs (n:nat): Strat := add Alice Bob dol l r n (dolAcBs (n+1)).
Theorem SGPE dol Ac Bs : ∀ (n:nat), SGPE ge (dolAcBs n).
Alice continues always and Bob stops always
CoFixpoint dolAsBc (n:nat): Strat := add Alice Bob dol r l n (dolAsBc (n+1)).
Theorem SGPE dol As Bc: ∀ (n:nat), SGPE ge (dolAsBc n).
Always give up
CoFixpoint dolAsBs (n:nat): Strat := add Alice Bob dol r r n (dolAsBs (n+1)).
Theorem NotSGPE dolAsBs : (v>1) → ˜(NashEq ge (dolAsBs 0)).
